Informed observers are becoming increasingly sceptical as to whether Australia will ever take delivery of a Virginia-class SSN. Photos: ADF.
The United States Navy has 49 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) in service. Sounds like a lot, right? Especially when compared with Australia’s paltry six ageing conventionally powered Collins-class boats.
But the US actually needs 66 SSNs to meet its current requirements. And that gap is widening as it is not building new Virginia-class SSNs fast enough to replace the ageing Los Angeles-class boats as they’re retired.
The current build rate of about 1.2 SSNs a year at the US’s two major shipyards has remained stagnant for more than five years. In order to meet its requirements and those of Australia under AUKUS Pillar 1, it needs to be building an average of 2.3 Virginias a year … now.
But, despite the Pentagon and Australia’s cash injections into industry to bolster the workforce and the supply chains, there are still shortfalls in skilled workers, in essence meaning that the 2.3 build rate remains purely aspirational at best.
The ABC’s Four Corners program last Monday (16 June) highlighted these and other issues.
And while I’m not one for saying ‘’I told you so’’, I bloody well told you so! These are issues that many in Defence, industry, politics, and specialist media on both sides of the Pacific have highlighted since details of the AUKUS Pillar 1 agreement became known in March 2023.
Despite wide reassuring smiles and nodding heads from most of those who Four Corners interviewed on whether Australia will receive its first Virginia boats from 2032 as planned – let alone ever – the evidence is clear that we likely won’t.
Head of the Australian Submarine Agency Vice-Admiral Jonathan Mead and Chief of Navy Vice-Admiral Mark Hammond both did their best to reassure viewers that it will all work out, and neither even entertained the thought of a plan B, let alone articulated what one might even look like.
VADM Hammond reminded viewers that it is “the United States Navy’s job to set the technical conditions to enable that to succeed”. In other words, “it’s out of our hands”.
Neither Chief of Navy VADM Mark Hammond (pictured) nor the head of the Australian Submarine Agency VADM Jonathan Mead would publicly entertain the possibility of an alternative to acquiring US Navy Virginia-class SSNs.
So, and despite a promised cash injection of $US3 billion from Australia to bolster the US shipbuilding industry and supply chains, $500 million of which has already been paid, we may never see a Virginia-class submarine flying Australia’s red ensign and there is precious little we can do about it.
Former US national security adviser Jake Sullivan said it all, really: “If the US woke up one day and decided it wasn’t going to follow through on AUKUS, could it do that? In reality, yes, of course. But then, what that’s missing is the basic idea of trust, and the logic of the deal.”
But how far do trust and having a deal get you when you’re dealing with the current Trump Administration? I would suggest that, based on Mr Trump’s recent track record in dealing with allies, both are close to meaningless.
VADM Mead also said the US had doubts over Australia’s ability to operate SSNs.
“They have questions,” he said. “It’s a new administration. We are working through the detail of those questions and providing the evidence, fact-based, driven evidence, to support the optimal pathway.
”They’re asking us if we’re ready. Are we ready on the infrastructure, for instance? Another question would be, ‘Are you ready to support nuclear-powered submarines?’ We say, ‘Yes, we are. We’re on track.”
But, writing in The Australian, Strategic Analysis Australia’s Peter Jennings said the “Albanese Government’s handling of AUKUS has been lazy, half-hearted and inattentive”, adding that “Defence’s performance has been unimaginative, controlling, and risk averse”.
While I’ve briefly touched on the subject before, it would be interesting to look at what plan B (or are we up to plan E now?) options Australia could consider in the event the Virginia SSNs never materialise.
- Significantly upgrade and retain the Collins-class boats and invest more in autonomous underwater vehicles until the UK-designed SSN-A submarines are ready from the early 2040s.
- Acquire a bridging capability of conventional submarines from South Korea, Germany or Sweden as soon as possible and invest more in autonomous underwater vehicles.
- Go back to the French with beret in hand, apologise for lying to them about AUKUS in 2021, and see whether either the Attack-class conventional-derivative program can be revived or an acquisition of French Barracuda SSNs could be made.
- Retire the Collins-class boats and temporarily give up a sovereign crewed submarine capability while as many Australian exchange officers and sailors as possible serve aboard US and UK SSNs operating in the region until the SSN-As are ready.
- In conjunction with Option 4, look to bolster Australia’s long-range strike capabilities through more autonomous underwater vehicles, as well as additional airpower such as more air-to-air refuellers, additional combat aircraft, and possibly a new bomber capability.
All of these options carry high to extreme levels of risk. But so does the AUKUS plan to acquire US-made submarines that likely will never be built in sufficient quantities.
Original Article published by Andrew McLaughlin on PS News.
